Abstract
Introduction

17
At any moment in time, the sensory information entering the brain is insufficient to give rise to our 18 rich perception of the outside world. To compute those rich percepts from incomplete and noisy 19 inputs, the brain has to employ prior experience about which causes are most likely responsible 20 for a given input (von Helmholtz, 1867) . Mathematically, this process can be formalized as proba- there is ample empirical evidence that human behavior is consistent with such probabilistic com-24 putations (reviewed in (Pouget et al., 2013; Ma and Jazayeri, 2014) ), how these computations are 25 implemented in the brain is far from clear. Our work builds on the previous observation that these 26 Bayesian computations map naturally onto a cortical architecture in which feedforward (bottom-27 up) pathways communicate the information in the likelihood function about the sensory inputs, 28 feedback (top-down) pathways communicate prior expectations, and cortical sensory neurons com-29 pute posterior beliefs about the variables that they represent (Mumford, 1992; Lee and Mumford, 30 2003). While it is conceptually straightforward to investigate the feedforward pathway by varying 31 the external stimulus in a way controlled by the experimenter and recording neural responses and 32 behavior (reviewed in (Parker and Newsome, 1998) ), it is less obvious how to probe the feedback ing/decoding models (Zohary et al., 1994; Abbott and Dayan, 1999; Shamir and Sompolinsky, 48 2006; Ecker et al., 2011 ) (reviewed in (Kohn et al., 2016 ), even when explicitly acknowledging 49 that some of that variability may be induced by extrasensory common inputs (Ecker et al., 2014, 50 2016). While it enables one to compute the effect of covariability on the information contained in 51 neural responses about the external stimulus, the classical framework makes no predictions about 52 its structure or source.
53
Our results extend those in a recent numerical study (Haefner et al., 2016) based on specific 54 assumptions about how exactly probabilities are represented in the brain, about the stimulus tuning 55 of the sensory neurons, and about the structure of the internal model. Our results further expose 56 the analytical relationships that drive the numerical observations in that study.
57
In the second part of this paper, we build on insights from the first part and demonstrate a way to use recordings of sensory neurons' responses to infer aspects of a subject's internal, prior beliefs.
59
In particular, we describe how to interpret them in terms of the stimulus to yield information about 60 the subject-specific strategies in psychophysics tasks.
61
Results
62
Our central hypothesis is of 'posterior coding' -that sensory neurons encode posterior beliefs over 63 latent variables in the brain's internal model (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 2003; 64 Fiser et al., 2010; Haefner et al., 2016 ). If they do, then their responses will depend both on firing rate 2 (r 2 ) firing rate 1 (r 1 )
Figure 3: Illustration of 'posterior coding.' (a) In visual psychophysical tasks, the experimenter varies some parameter s to generate an image (e.g. changing the orientation of a grating pattern). This will cause changes to the distribution P pxq if x depends on s.xpsq represents the direction along which the posterior mean varies with s. (b) The 'posterior coding' hypothesis: a neuron's response, r, depends on some statistics of the posterior distribution over x through an unknown encoding R. Tuning curves f psq in this framework reflect consistent changes in r as the posterior, P px|Eq, changes as a function of s.
like features at particular retinotopic locations (Bornschein et al., 2013) or the intensity of such 81 features (Olshausen and Field, 1996; Schwartz and Simoncelli, 2001) , though the exact nature of 82 these variables is not important for our results. In higher visual areas, variables are likely related 83 to the identity of objects and faces (Kersten et al., 2004) . I represents these higher-level variables,
84
as well as knowledge about the visual surround, task-related knowledge about the probability of 85 upcoming stimuli, etc. There is an important distinction between the variables in the brain's 86 internal model (i.e. x and I) and the responses of neurons that encode the distributions of these 87 variables via some representation R (Figure 3 ).
88
In this framework, classical feedforward tuning curves (Dayan and Abbott, 2001 ) reflect proba-89 bilistic relationships between the variables represented by a neuron and the sensory inputs. Changes 90 to the evidence E along an experimenter-defined direction s (e.g. rotating an image of a grating) 91 affect the inferred probability of P px|Eq. If the variable x represented by the recorded neurons is 92 statistically dependent on s, then the likelihood P pE|xq will vary as s is varied. As a result, the 93 posterior P px|Eq will also vary (Figure 3a) , and in turn so will the neural responses representing 94 it. The dependence of the mean of those responses on s gives rise to tuning curves, denoted f psq 95 (Figure 3b , Methods). Furthermore, for small changes in s around some reference point, s " 0, we 96 can linearly approximate the average neural responses:r " f p0q`f 1 p0qs. That is, the population 97 response, r, changes in the f 1 " df {ds-direction due a changing posterior belief about x, which in 98 turn is driven by changes in the external stimulus Epsq (Averbeck et al., 2006) .
99
We now derive predictions for the effect of the prior on sensory responses. When a subject 100 performs a perceptual decision-making task, the experimenter defines a distribution of stimuli
101
P task pEq used in that task. Learning a task implies an increase in the subject's prior for P task pEq as 102 they begin to expect stimuli drawn from this distribution. In discrimination tasks, the stimulus is (1)
Intuitively, P pxq defines a small volume of increased probability mass in x´space, elongated along 111 a linexpsq given by the dependence of the mean of P pxq on s (Figure 3a) . in these trials will yield a symmetric posterior (Figure 4a for an example). However, inference in 119 the brain is at best approximate, both in terms of computation and in terms of representation.
120
Hence on any one trial, the actual likelihood and prior used by the brain deviates from the correct Trial-to-trial changes in the likelihood entail trial-to-trial changes in the posterior that lie pri-126 marily alongxpsq since that is the line along which most of the prior mass is concentrated ( Figure   127 4b; see also Figure S1 ). Furthermore, changes in the subject's internal beliefs about s -both 
148
We emphasize that our predictions only describe how learning a task-specific prior changes The subject has learned to expect stimuli from either of the categories, increasing prior mass in x alongxpsq. 'Zero-signal' trials in which the given stimulus contains no information about the correct category correspond to a likelihood with mass on either side of the decision boundary. Whether the prior is bimodal depends on the fraction of zero-signal and zero-signal trials in the experiment and is not important for our argument (see Figure S1 ). (b) Trial-to-trial changes in the likelihood, whether due to changes in the stimulus or due to noise in its representation, will shift mass in the posterior along thexpsq direction. (c) Unequal prior expectations about the upcoming category at the beginning of the trial (e.g. due to serial dependencies) will shift the posterior alongxpsq similar to the changing likelihoods in (b). (d) Axes and f psq as in Figure 3b , with the change in mean firing rates around the decision boundary (s " 0) indicated by the derivative of the tuning curves, f 1 . The equivalence of posteriors in (b) and (c) implies that firing rates will move along f 1 regardless of whether the stimulus itself changed or beliefs about it changed. f must be measured during the task in order to account for the task-specific prior.
test the task-specific predictions is to hold the stimulus constant while switching between two 153 comparable tasks a subject is performing, predictably altering their task-specific prior (Methods).
154
The difference in neural responses to zero-signal stimuli will isolate the task-dependent component structure in sensory responses can be used to infer properties of these beliefs.
209
The task structure of a simple discrimination task as discussed above determines the only 210 task-relevant belief (which of two target stimuli is the better explanation for the external inputs).
211
However, more complicated tasks may involve inference over more than one variable, and therefore Importantly, the probabilistic inference framework also suggests an intuitive method for in-222 terpreting top-down sources of covariability. As described above, tuning curves have a general In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this approach, we used it to infer the structure 
260
Maintaining this uncertainty is the optimal strategy from the subject's perspective given their 261 imperfect knowledge of the world. However, when compared to certain (perfect knowledge), it 262 decreases behavioral performance on the actual task defined by the experimenter. In the proba-263 bilistic inference framework, behavioral performance is optimal when the internal model learnt by 264 the subject exactly corresponds to the experimenter-defined one. An empirical prediction, there-265 fore, is that eigenvalues corresponding to the correct task-defined stimulus dimension will increase 266 with learning, while eigenvalues representing other dimensions should decrease. While no study 267 has analyzed data in this framework, we know that the first and third eigenvalue must initially be to show how aspects of the low-dimensional structure in the observed covariability can be used to 300 reverse engineer the structure of the internal beliefs that vary on a trial-to-trial basis.
301
The nature of our predictions directly addresses several debates in the field. First, they pro- (Albright, 2012) ). In particular, the idea of 'perceptual equivalence' (Finke, 1989) Ganguli and Simoncelli, 2014; Wei and Stocker, 2015) .
340
Previous work has demonstrated the possibility of using behavioral judgements to infer the shape 341 of a subject's prior (Houlsby et al., 2013) . Our results are complementary to behavioral methods, 342 but have the advantage that the amount of information that can be collected in neurophysiology 343 experiments far exceeds that in psychophysical studies.
344
The detail with which the internal beliefs can be recovered from the statistical structure in neu- With nonlinear effects of the prior and in order to infer non-orthogonal causes, more sophisticated 350 tools will be required to infer latent structure in sensory responses (Cunningham and Yu, 2014) .
351
Importantly, our work suggests a way to interpret this structure, and makes predictions about how 352 it should change with learning and attention.
353
Methods
354
Definition of tuning curves
355
Most generally, one can think of the process of encoding the posterior as a functional R that maps 356 from a distribution over x to a distribution of neural responses: P prq " R rP pxqs (Figure 1 ). We 357 require thatR is smooth asx changes (whereȳ denotes the mean of y across trials), which allows 358 us to use linear approximations of tuning functions. We define the tuning function of neuron i as 359 the neuron's mean response across trials within a specific task context as E is changed with s:
where P px|sq " ş P px|E, IqP pE|sqP pIq dE dI.
361
Prediction for the difference between comparable tasks
362
The magnitude of task-dependent response variability depends on the magnitude of the trial-to-trial changes in beliefs about s, and on strength and shape of the learned prior alongxpsq. Two arbitrary tasks will in general differ in these aspects as well as in the intrinsic covariance of responses to the zero-signal stimulus. We call two tasks 'comparable' when they agree in both the magnitude of the prior and the intrinsic response covariance, as can reasonably be expected, for instance, in rotationally symmetric situations where all that changes between the tasks is the angle (Bondy and Cumming, 2016) or direction (Cohen and Newsome, 2008) of the discrimination boundary while the zero-signal stimulus stays the same. In that case the strength of the respective f 1 f 1´c omponent can be assumed to be the same and hence, the intrinsic covariability can be subtract out: in belief k, and C 0 ij represents the intrinsic covariance.
375
The model in our proof-of-concept simulations has been described previously (Haefner et al., Fiser, J., Berkes, P., Orbán, G. and Lengyel, M. (2010) . Statistically optimal perception and learning: from behavior to neural representations. Trends in cognitive sciences 14, 119-30.
Moreno-Bote, R., Beck, J., Kanitscheider, I., Pitkow, X., Latham, P. and Pouget, A. (2014) . Figure S1: 2D simulation of the effect of a prior that is elongated/bimodal alongxpsq on the mean of the posterior. a: A bimodal prior, modeling the subject's expectations about the stimulus (in x) during a coarse-discrimination task. b: On 'zero signal' trials, the stimulus is drawn from a distribution around xps " 0q, yielding likelihood functions that are shifted uniformly around x " 0, shown here for two example trials. c: The resulting posteriors for each of these likelihoods are themselves bimodal. d: The means of these posteriors (triangles in c, dots here) tend to lie along the higher-probability region between the prior modes, despite an isotropic distribution of likelihood means. e: Displacement of the mean of the likelihood to the mean of the posterior under the prior in a. Thus, even in the absence of serial dependencies, 'uniform' trial-to-trial variability in the stimulus yields variability in the posterior means primarily along the axis with the most mass in the prior. f-j Same as a-e but for a unimodal but elongated prior, as might be expected in a fine discrimination task. Figure S3 : Principal components of model neurons due to only stimulus-driven correlations. Note that the sinusoidal eigenvectors at the same frequency have indistinguishable eigenvalues and hence form quadrature pairs, implying circular symmetry with respect to neurons' tuning. There is no more variance along the vertical-horizontal preferred orientation axis than then oblique axis.
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